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When people generate responses during a divergent thinking task, some responses are “old” 
(retrieved from memory) and some are “new” (generated on the spot). K.J. Gilhooly, E. Fioratou, 
S.H. Anthony, and V. Wynn (2007) suggested that old and new responses stem from different 
cognitive strategies and differ in key ways. The present research explored the old/new scoring 
method in a sample of 143 young adults. After completing unusual uses tasks, the participants 
classified each response as old or new. The creativity of each response was also rated by three 
judges and by the participants themselves. As in past research, “old” responses appeared 
significantly earlier in the task and were rated as significantly less creative by both the judges 
and the participants. Old and new responses, however, correlated equally strongly with 
predictors of creative ability, such as openness to experience and its facets. Overall, the old/new 
scoring approach appears promising as a way of illuminating the diverse mental strategies people 
use to generate ideas. 
 





The basic notion behind divergent thinking tasks—to study how people come up with creative 
ideas, give them a simple prompt and ask them to come up with ideas—remains compelling after 
many decades of use. But like all open‐ended tasks, divergent thinking tasks pose a challenge to 
researchers: what do you do with the huge heap of responses that people generate? Developing 
ways of quantifying these qualitative responses has been a major part of divergent thinking 
research. Recent years have seen a renewal of interest in assessment and scoring methods, from 
variations on classical frequency metrics (e.g., Plucker, Qian, & Wang, 2011) to subjective 
ratings (e.g., Benedek, Mühlmann, Jauk, & Neubauer, 2013; Silvia et al., 2008) to automated 
scoring methods (e.g., Acar & Runco, 2014; Beaty, Silvia, Nusbaum, Jauk, & Benedek, 2014; 
Prabhakaran, Green, & Gray, 2014). In the present research, we evaluate the old/new scoring 
method, developed by Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, and Wynn (2007), which has shown promise 
in their original study and in a recent fMRI study (Benedek et al., 2014a). 
 
One appeal of the old/new scoring approach is its fiendish simplicity. First, people generate 
responses to a divergent thinking task, according to standard administration methods. After the 
task, people read their responses and classify each one as old or new. Old responses are ideas that 
people had seen or heard of before. As they were already stored in memory, these were ideas that 
predated the task and that were simply retrieved from memory. For example, common responses 
during a brick‐use task are “to break a window” and “to keep a car from rolling backward.” 
People do use bricks for these purposes, so for many respondents, the uses are remembered 
rather than generated. New responses, in contrast, are ideas that people generated on the spot. As 
a result, these responses are more properly thought of as creative because people came up with 
the idea by combining or transforming knowledge. 
 
The old/new scoring method grew out of Gilhooly et al.'s (2007) analysis of people's strategies 
for unusual uses tasks. They found that most people started with a memory retrieval strategy: 
they searched memory for interesting and quirky examples of things one could use an object for. 
These responses were thus mostly “old,” because they were uses people had encountered before 
and stored in memory. Over time, people tended to switch from trying to recall uses to applying 
generation strategies, such as disassembling an object or finding broad categories of uses (e.g., 
cooking, fighting) that an object could be repurposed for. These strategies are more executively 
demanding than memory retrieval, but they were more likely to result in “new” uses. 
 
In the initial study, some differences between old and new responses were explored by asking a 
sample of 103 people to generate unusual uses for a tire or barrel and then classify each response 
as old or new (Gilhooly et al., 2007, Study 2). A single judge rated the creative quality of 
subsamples of 20 old and 20 new responses, and the new responses received higher novelty 
scores. During the task, old responses were more likely to appear early on and new responses 
were more likely to appear later, consistent with the idea that people tend to start with a simple 
memory retrieval strategy and then later shift to more complex strategies (Beaty & Silvia, 2012). 
Some evidence for the differential meaning of old and new responses came from their relations 
with verbal fluency tasks. The number of new uses was more strongly linked to letter fluency (a 
relatively more executively driven task), whereas the number of old uses was more strongly 
linked to category fluency (a relatively less executively driven task). In short, old and new 
responses do seem to stem from different strategies, and new responses appear to be more 
creative. 
 
Some additional evidence for old/new scoring comes from a recent neuroimaging study. 
Benedek et al. (2014a) recruited 35 people to generate unusual objects in an MRI scanner. 
People had 60 seconds to generate uses for each object. After, people classified their own 
responses as old or new. Three raters then subjectively scored the responses. Many of Gilhooly 
et al.'s (2007) findings were replicated. The new responses were rated as more creative than the 
old ones, and people were more likely to give old responses at the start of the task. The 
neuroimaging results revealed that new responses, relative to old, were associated with greater 
activity in the anterior part of the left inferior parietal cortex, a region involved in mental 
simulation (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007). 
 
In the present research, we sought to evaluate old/new scoring more closely. Thus far, past work 
suggests that the method is promising, and a few key effects—new responses come later and are 
more creative—have been replicated. Not much evidence, however, addresses whether new 
responses show stronger relationships with markers of creativity, such as personality traits, 
cognitive abilities, and creative backgrounds. Gilhooly et al. (2007) found that old and new 
responses had different correlations with verbal fluency tasks; Benedek et al.'s (2014a) study 
found that new and old responses had some different brain activation patterns. Our study thus 
expanded the evidence for validity by assessing a broad range of factors relevant to creativity in 
a large and diverse sample. We sought to replicate some of the features of old/new scoring—
such as whether new responses are more creative and appear later—as well as extend past 
research. In particular, we wanted to see if old and new responses showed differential 
relationships with established markers of creativity. For example, does openness to experience, a 
trait central to creativity, more strongly predict the creativity of new responses? If so, then 
researchers could likely find stronger effects by focusing on the subset of responses that best 
reflect the operation of creative strategies. The participants thus completed a pair of divergent 






A total of 151 students at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG) participated 
as part of a voluntary research option in a psychology class. Eight participants were excluded 
because they were non‐native speakers of English or because they had scores higher than 2 on an 
infrequency scale (an updated version of the Chapman and Chapman 1983 scale) intended to 
catch inattentive or random responding (Maniaci & Rogge, 2014; McKibben & Silvia, 2015), 
leaving a final sample of 143. Most people in the final sample were female (69%) and young 
(M = 19.22, SD = 3.06, Mdn = 19, Min/Max = 18, 51). The sample was racially and ethnically 
diverse, according to self‐reports: 36% African American, 9% Asian American or Pacific 
Islander, 52% European American, 7% Hispanic or Latino/a, and 5% Native American. (People 




The research was approved by the UNCG Institutional Review Board. People took part in 
sessions of up to eight people. After providing informed consent, people learned that the study 
was about personality and creative thinking styles. The experimenter explained the divergent 
thinking tasks and gave instructions for the old/new judgments people would make. The study 
started with two divergent thinking tasks, followed by measures of personality and creative 
achievement. 
 
Divergent thinking tasks 
 
The participants completed two divergent thinking tasks: unusual uses for a box and a rope. As 
in our past research, we emphasized that people should try to “be creative” (Nusbaum, Silvia, & 
Beaty, 2014) and that the creativity of their ideas was more important than the quantity.1 People 




After people generated their responses, the software presented their responses to them and asked 
for their self‐ratings of creativity. The instructions said “Now we'd like to know your own 
opinions about how creative your ideas were. In the next part, each of your ideas will appear on 
the screen. Please rate how creative, in your own opinion, each idea is.” The ideas were 
presented in the order in which they were generated, and people were asked to rate each idea 
(e.g., “How creative, in your opinion, was this use for a BOX?”) on a 5‐point scale (1 = not at all 




After rating each of their ideas, people gave old/new judgments for each one. The experimenter 
had described these judgments prior to the tasks, and the software reiterated the instructions. For 
example, for the box task people were told “For this part, you'll see each of your uses for a BOX 
again. Please rate whether each idea is OLD or NEW. OLD IDEAS are uses that you saw or 
heard before sometime in the past. These are uses that you remembered from somewhere. NEW 
IDEAS are uses that you came up with yourself during the study. You haven't seen or heard 
these before.” People were presented each idea in the order in which it was generated, and they 
simply indicated whether it was “OLD: I saw or heard of this somewhere before” (scored 0) or 
“NEW: I came up with this on the spot during the experiment” (scored 1). 
 
Subjective scoring of DT responses 
 
The responses people gave to the box and rope task were scored for creativity by three raters (the 
three authors), all of whom had extensive experience with subjective scoring. As in our past 
work, we first deleted all information linking a response to a participant's other data or responses 
and all information about the response's serial order. The responses were then sorted 
alphabetically and scored independently using a 5‐point scale (1 = not at all creative, 5 = very 
creative). Responses receiving the lowest scores tend to be actual uses for objects (e.g., using a 
box to contain or store common objects, using a rope to tie or fasten something) or highly 
common uses given by large proportions of the sample. Responses receiving higher scores 
tended to be quirky, clever, elaborate, and, for lack of a better word, creative. 
 
1 The experimenter emphasized that people should try to generate creative ideas at the start of the session, and the 
task's instructions reiterated this point. For example, the written instructions people read before the box task said:  
For this task, you'll be asked to come up with as many original and creative uses for a BOX as you can. The 
goal is to come up with creative ideas, which are ideas that strike people as clever, unusual, interesting, 
uncommon, humorous, innovative, or different. Your ideas do not have to be practical or realistic; they can be 
quirky, silly, or even strange, so long as they are CREATIVE rather than ordinary. You can enter as many ideas 
as you like; just press ENTER after each one. The task will take 3 minutes. You can type in as many ideas as 
you like until then, but creative quality is more important than quantity. It is better to have a few really good 




We measured personality with the 100‐item HEXACO (Lee & Ashton, 2004), which measures 
the six factors in the HEXACO model (Ashton & Lee, 2007): Honesty–Humility, Emotionality, 
Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience. People responded 
to each item using a 5‐point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Most of the factors 
resemble their counterparts in popular Big Five models, but Honesty–Humility and 
Agreeableness differ most (Lee & Ashton, 2012). We were primarily interested in openness to 
experience, which looms large in creativity research (Fürst, Ghisletta, & Lubart, 2015; 
Karwowski, Lebuda, Wisniewska, & Gralewski, 2013; Kaufman, 2013). The HEXACO provides 
a global openness to experience scale as well as subscales for four facets: aesthetic 
appreciation, unconventionality, inquisitiveness, and creativity. 
 
To expand on the assessment of openness to experience, we included the O/I subscales from the 
Big Five Aspect Scales (BFAS; DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007). The BFAS splits openness 
to experience into openness and intellect aspects, and this distinction has proven fertile in 
understanding how openness to experience influences creativity (Kaufman et al., 2015; Nusbaum 
& Silvia, 2011b). Each subscale has 10 items, and people respond on a 5‐point scale 
(1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). 
 
Creative hobbies and achievements 
 
We measured creative achievements with the Creative Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ; 
Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005), a popular self‐report scale that assesses accumulated 
creative achievements in 10 domains. Higher scores reflect increasing levels of observable, 
public accomplishments in a creative field. Common creative behaviors, akin to everyday 
creativity, were assessed with the Biographical Inventory of Creative Behaviors (BICB; 
Batey, 2007), a 34‐item scale that lists common creative activities (e.g., “Composed a piece of 
music,” “Written a short story”) and asks people to check which ones they have done in the past 
year. Both the CAQ and BICB have good psychometric properties and are widely used in 
creativity research (for a review, see Silvia, Wigert, Reiter‐Palmon, & Kaufman, 2012). We used 




Data Reduction and Model Approach 
 
For many analyses, the data have a nested, multilevel structure. People completed two tasks, so 
some of their scores—the old/new judgments, self‐rated creativity, the raters' scores, and the 
responses' serial order—vary within person. Other variables vary between people, such as 
HEXACO, Openness/Intellect, BICB, and CAQ scores. Some of our research questions are 
within‐person hypotheses, such as whether people's old/new judgments and the responses' serial 
order are associated with subjective ratings of creativity, so we used multilevel models to 
analyze the data for many of our hypotheses. The regression coefficients for the multilevel 
analyses are all unstandardized, given the complexity of establishing standardized solutions for 
multilevel data (Snijders & Bosker, 1994). All models were estimated in Mplus 7.3 using 
maximum likelihood with robust standard errors. 
 
Our main outcome was the rated creativity of the responses to the divergent thinking tasks. The 
raters' scores showed good internal consistency. Cronbach's alpha, computed from the estimated 
within‐person correlations, was .65 for the box task and .67 for the rope task. The subjective 
ratings of the divergent thinking responses were modeled as a latent variable. At the within‐
person level, a latent “creativity” variable was formed using the three raters' scores as indicators. 
At the between‐person level, a latent “creativity” variable was formed using the three rater's 
scores (technically the random intercepts that vary across within‐level clusters). The between‐
level residual variances were fixed to zero because they are typically extremely small and 
convergence problems can arise when near‐zero residuals are estimated. The factor loadings 
were constrained to be equal across levels to ensure that the variable was invariant across levels 
(Heck & Thomas, 2009). The intraclass correlation for this latent creativity variable was .34, so 
roughly a third of the variance in ratings was at the between‐person level. 
 




We averaged the number of new, old, and total responses across the two divergent thinking tasks 
to create overall scores. On average, people generated 8.36 total responses per task (SD = 4.40, 
Min/Max = 1.50–26.00). Of these, an average of 3.62 were new (SD = 2.80, Min/Max = .00–
20.50) and 4.75 were old (SD = 3.01, Min/Max = .50–5.00). The correlation between the number 
of old and new responses was small (r = .15 [.01, .28]). 
 
Did the raters view the new ideas as more creative? 
 
Were the new responses more creative than the old ones? People's old/new judgments were 
specified as the predictor (centered within person), and the latent creativity variable (described 
earlier) was the outcome. Old/new judgments significantly predicted creativity 
ratings, b = .37, SE = .03, p < .001. As in past research (Benedek et al., 2014a; Gilhooly 
et al., 2007), the new responses were rated as more creative than the old ones. 
 
Did people see their new ideas as more creative? 
 
Old/new judgments had the same relationship with people's own ratings of their responses. The 
participants' self‐rating for each response was specified as the outcome, and old/new judgments 
were the within‐person predictor (again centered within person). Old/new judgments 
significantly predicted self‐rated creativity, b = 1.09, SE = .07, p < .001, so the participants rated 
their new responses as more creative than their old ones. 
 
When did new ideas appear? 
 
Finally, we explored whether the distribution of old and new responses changed across time. At 
the within‐person level, we specified old/new judgments as the within‐person predictor (centered 
within person) and serial order—the serial position of a response, ranging from 1 to k—as the 
outcome. Old/new judgments significantly predicted serial order (b = 1.22, SE = .26, p < .001): 
new responses were more likely to be generated later, a finding that replicates past studies 
(Benedek et al., 2014a; Gilhooly et al., 2007). 
 
As an aside, we also replicated the serial order effect for creativity ratings (Beaty & 
Silvia, 2012). When the raters' scores are the outcome, the serial order of the responses 
significantly predicted subjective ratings: later responses were rated as more creative 
(b = .011, SE = .003, p < .001). 
 
In summary, old and new responses behaved as one would expect. “Old” responses retrieved 
from memory were more likely to appear early in the task, and “new” responses generated on the 
spot were more likely to come later, reflecting a shift from simple memory retrieval strategies to 
more complex ideation strategies (Gilhooly et al., 2007). “New” responses were also 
significantly more creative, as judged by independent raters and by the participants themselves. 
 
Predictors of Response Quantity 
 
Predictors of fluency—how many old, new, and total responses people generated—are shown in 
Table 1. These are conventional between‐person models, so standardized effects are reported. 
For the total number of responses, notable effects appeared for the HEXACO Openness to 
Experience factor (r = −.20 [−.35, −.05]) and the BFAS Openness subscale (r = −.24 [−.38, 
−.11]). Both coefficients were negative, so people higher in openness generated fewer responses 
overall. Conscientiousness, in contrast, correlated positively with fluency (r = .24 [.07, .42]). 
 
Table 1. Predictors of the Total Number of Responses and the Number of Old and New 
Responses 
Predictor Old New Total Number 
Honesty–Humility −.18 [−.36, .01] −.06 [−.24, .11] −.16 [−.36, .03] 
Emotionality −.01 [−.23, .21] .08 [−.09, .25] .04 [−.14, .23] 
Extraversion .07 [−.14, .28] .15 [−.04, .35] .14 [−.06, .35] 
Agreeableness −.21 [−.39, −.02] .05 [−.11, .21] −.11 [−.29, .07] 
Conscientiousness .24 [.04, .44] .13 [−.04, .29] .24 [.07, .42] 
Openness to Experience −.25 [−.41, −.09] −.06 [−.20, .10] −.20 [−.35, −.05] 
O: Creativity −.05 [−.22, .11] .02 [−.13, .17] −.03 [−.19, .14] 
O: Unconventionality −.15 [−.29, −.02] −.01 [−.13, .12] −.11 [−.23, .02] 
O: Inquisitiveness −.17 [−.32, −.03] −.08 [−.25, .09] −.17 [−.33, −.01] 
O: Aesthetic Appreciation −.20 [−.37, −.04] −.06 [−.19, .08] −.18 [−.33, −.03] 
BFAS: Openness −.27 [−.41, −.12] −.10 [−.23, .04] −.24 [−.38, −.11] 
BFAS: Intellect .01 [−.12, .14] .01 [−.13, .15] .01 [−.13, .15] 
CAQ −.01 [−.20, .18] .03 [−.11, .17] .01 [−.15, .17] 
BICB −.03 [−.18, .12] .06 [−.15, .28] .02 [−.16, .20] 
Rated Creativity: Old −.38 [−.51, −.24] −.30 [−.43, −.17] −.45 [−.58, −.31] 
Rated Creativity: New −.26 [−.41, −.10] −.26 [−.38, −.13] −.34 [−.48, −.19] 
Note. The coefficients are correlations; 95% confidence intervals are in brackets. The HEXACO factors and the 
rated creativity factors were modeled as latent variables; all other predictors are observed variables. The scores for 
the box and rope tasks were averaged. CAQ = Creative Achievement Questionnaire; BICB = Biographical Inventory 
of Creative Behaviors. 
 
Breaking down the responses into old and new responses (Table 1) shows that the effects were 
largely driven by the number of old responses people generated. Most of the correlations with the 
number of new responses were small in size. Openness to Experience (r = −.25 [−.41, −.09]), 
BFAS Openness (r = −.27 [−.41, −.12]), Agreeableness (r = −.21 [−.39, −.02]), and 
Conscientiousness (r = .24 [.04, .44]), however, significantly predicted the number of old 
responses. As a result, their effects on overall fluency were a result of their relationship with old 
responses: people higher in openness to experience (and several of its facets), openness, and 
agreeableness generated fewer old ideas, and people higher in conscientiousness generated more 
old ideas. 
 
Predictors of Response Quality 
 
We then turned to whether the creativity ratings of old and new responses differentially 
correlated with personality and creative backgrounds. For these between‐person models, we 
specified latent old and new factors. As Figure 1 shows, each factor was defined by the creativity 
ratings for the three raters. Old and new responses received similar ratings: the correlation 
was r = .75 [.61, .89]. Table 1 shows the correlations between rated creativity and fluency; the 
correlations were all negative, so people who generated better ideas generated fewer ideas.2 For 
example, quality and quantity correlated r = −.38 [−.51, −.24] for old ideas and r = −.26 [−.38, 
−.13] for new ideas. 
 
 
Figure 1. CFA and correlation between the rated creative quality of old and new responses. 
 
2 We commonly find small negative correlations between creative quality and quantity when we instruct people to 
“be creative” and use subjective scoring (Nusbaum et al., 2014). The small negative correlation is consistent with 
people adopting a strategic and controlled approach to divergent thinking (Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011a; Silvia, 2015). 
It is worth highlighting that traditional methods for divergent thinking—instructing people to generate as many ideas 
as possible and then coding for uniqueness—yields highly confounded measures of quality and quantity. 
 
We next computed correlations between old and new creativity ratings (using the latent variables 
shown in Figure 1) and the HEXACO personality traits, which were specified as latent variables 
in which each factor was indicated by its four subscale scores (Lee & Ashton, 2004). Table 2 
shows the effects. Several of the HEXACO factors—Honesty–Humility (largest r = .14), 
Emotionality (aka Neuroticism; largest r = −.02), and Agreeableness (largest r = −.07)—had at 
most small relationships with the rated creativity of the responses, consistent with most past 
research on personality and divergent thinking (e.g., Batey & Furnham, 2006). 
Conscientiousness had modest negative correlations with creativity, particularly for the new 
(r = −.16) responses over the old (r = −.05). Similarly, Extraversion had negative correlations 
with rated creativity—not a typical finding (Batey & Furnham, 2006)—and the effects were 
larger for the new (r = −.20) than for the old responses (r = −.12). 
 
Table 2. Correlations with the Rated Creative Quality of Old and New Responses 
Predictor Old New 
Honesty–Humility .14 [−.07, .35] .11 [−.06, .29] 
Emotionality .01 [−.23, .24] −.02 [−.21, .17] 
Extraversion −.12 [−.31, .08] −.20 [−.42, .01] 
Agreeableness −.07 [−.27, .14] .04 [−.19, .27] 
Conscientiousness −.05 [−.28, .18] −.16 [−.37, .05] 
Openness to Experience .40 [.23, .57] .30 [.11, .50] 
O: Creativity .22 [.05, .39] .14 [−.03, .30] 
O: Unconventionality .23 [.05, .41] .14 [−.01, .28] 
O: Inquisitiveness .09 [−.09, .27] .05 [−.12,.22] 
O: Aesthetic Appreciation .38 [.24, .51] .31 [.15, .47] 
BFAS: Openness .33 [.18, .48] .12 [−.04, .29] 
BFAS: Intellect .09 [−.10, .29] .08 [−.08, .24] 
CAQ .10 [−.07, .28] .02 [−.14, .18] 
BICB −.03 [−.21, .16] −.03 [−.19, .13] 
Note. The coefficients are correlations; 95% confidence intervals are in brackets. The HEXACO factors and the 
rated creativity factors were modeled as latent variables; all other predictors are observed variables. The scores for 
the box and rope tasks were averaged. CAQ = Creative Achievement Questionnaire; BICB = Biographical Inventory 
of Creative Behaviors. 
 
Openness to experience had the largest effect sizes of the HEXACO traits. The effects, however, 
were similar regardless of whether the new (r = .30) or old (r = .40) responses were analyzed. To 
explore openness to experience in more detail, we examined the correlations between its four 
facets and the creativity of the responses; the correlations are shown in Table 2. The correlations 
for the facets mirrored the effects for the higher‐order factor: old and new responses generally 
had the same relationships. 
 
We conducted similar analyses for the BFAS openness and intellect factors and for the CAQ and 
BICB, the two measures of creative activities and achievements. These four variables, treated as 
observed scores, were correlated with the latent creativity ratings for all responses and for the old 
and new subsets. Table 2 displays the correlations. The CAQ, BICB, and BFAS intellect scales 
had small effects at most (rs < .10). The BFAS openness scale had larger effect sizes, and its 
relationships with the creativity of the responses was somewhat lower for the new (r = .12) than 




The present research examined old/new scoring, an intriguing approach to assessing divergent 
thinking that can give insight into how people generate their ideas. Many recent scoring methods 
suggest that divergent thinking tasks are more efficient and valid when subsets of responses are 
analyzed, such as the two responses people see as their best (Silvia et al., 2008) or the top two or 
three based on raters' scores (Benedek et al., 2013). Old/new scoring can be seen as an instance 
of a subset approach: old and new responses likely stem from different cognitive strategies, so 
they probably have different relationships with other markers of creativity. 
 
As new scores more likely reflect creative processes, we wanted to evaluate the differential 
validity of the old and new responses. Our study replicated several findings that appeared in both 
past studies (Benedek et al., 2014a; Gilhooly et al., 2007). The raters judged the new responses 
as more creative than the old responses, and the new responses appeared later in the task, 
consistent with a shift from initially retrieving ideas to applying generative strategies. In 
addition, when asked to rate their own responses, the participants rated their new responses as 
more creative than their old ones. 
 
Our findings do not fully support, however, the possibility of carving out the old from the new 
responses when assessing a person's divergent thinking ability. The creative quality of old and 
new responses were highly correlated, and people who received higher creativity scores from the 
raters—people high in openness to experience and BFAS openness—generally got higher scores 
on all their responses. The correlations between these traits were essentially the same for the old 
and the new responses (see Table 2), so the subset of new responses did not yield larger effect 
sizes. For quantity, however, some differences were found: people higher in openness to 
experience, for example, generated fewer old responses. 
 
In addition, the pattern of fluency scores suggests that analyzing only the new responses might 
be impractical. People varied substantially in how many responses they generated, as in most 
divergent thinking studies, but they also varied in how many new responses they generated. 
Some people generated only a few new responses, and a few generated none. As a result, the data 
are sparse—or missing—for some participants if only the new responses are analyzed. Other 
subset methods hold the number constant across respondents, such as the best two or three 
responses, so the number of responses available to score—and hence the reliability of the 
scores—is not affected by a respondent's overall fluency. 
 
The differential validity of old and new responses should be explored further in future work. Our 
study emphasized predictors related to personality traits and creative activities. We did not find 
notably different correlations for old and new responses, but it is likely that predictors related to 
cognitive abilities—such as fluid intelligence, verbal knowledge, and associative and retrieval 
abilities—would differentially predict old and new responses more sharply. A range of cognitive 
abilities foster better divergent thinking (Benedek, Jauk, Sommer, Arendasy, & 
Neubauer, 2014b; Benedek, Könen, & Neubauer, 2012; Silvia & Beaty, 2012; Silvia, Beaty, & 
Nusbaum, 2013) in ways that could differentiate old and new responses. For example, people 
higher in fluid intelligence (Gf) are more able to apply an ideational strategy that yields good 
ideas (Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011a, Study 2). Likewise, people higher in broad retrieval ability can 
manage directed search processes in memory more effectively, making it easier to retrieve 
knowledge that is not highly accessible (Avitia & Kaufman, 2014; Silvia et al., 2013). It is 
possible that cognitive abilities, not personality traits, are where different relationships with old 
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